Microsoft 365 edition · Version 26.11.18.2
Health Care Security Baseline (HCSB)
A security baseline for Microsoft 365 in health care organizations
HCSB · Microsoft 365
Overview
Controls by HIPAA Standard
-
- AUTH-01Require multifactor authentication for every user
- AUTH-02Require multifactor authentication for administrative roles
- AUTH-03Require phishing-resistant authentication for administrators
- AUTH-04Block legacy authentication protocols
- AUTH-05Disable SMTP AUTH client submission except for documented device accounts
- AUTH-06Block device code flow and authentication transfer
- AUTH-07Disable weak authentication methods
- AUTH-08Every active user is registered for multifactor authentication
- AUTH-09Use a custom banned password list and smart lockout
- AUTH-10Enforce password protection on on-premises Active Directory
- AUTH-11Do not force periodic password expiration
- AUTH-12Respond automatically to risky sign-ins and risky users
- AUTH-13Protect security information registration
- AUTH-14Synchronize password hashes in hybrid environments
-
- ACC-01Provide break-glass administrative access
- ACC-02Limit Global Administrators to fewer than five, with at least two
- ACC-03Use dedicated, cloud-only administrative accounts
- ACC-04Assign privileged roles just in time
- ACC-05Control application consent and registration
- ACC-06Restrict device join and local administrator rights
- ACC-07Reach shared mailboxes only through individual accounts
- ACC-08Require a managed device for access to organizational data
- ACC-09Protect organizational data on personal mobile devices
-
- EXT-01Limit guest invitations and guest directory access
- EXT-02Restrict SharePoint and OneDrive external sharing
- EXT-03Set safe sharing defaults and guest expiration
- EXT-04Limit Teams external communication to known partners
- EXT-05Secure Teams meetings, including telehealth
- EXT-06Keep organizational mail out of personal accounts and add-ins
- EXT-07Restrict Power BI and Fabric publishing and external sharing
-
- TRN-01Block automatic forwarding to external addresses
- TRN-02Encrypt outbound email containing patient information
- TRN-03Publish SPF and enable DKIM for every sending domain
- TRN-04Enforce DMARC on every domain
- TRN-05Do not let mail flow rules or allow lists bypass filtering
- TRN-06Identify mail from external senders
- TRN-07Reject unauthenticated Direct Send
- TRN-08Detect and act on patient information in outbound content
Reference
About HCSB
About This Baseline
HCSB is an openly published, freely available security baseline for health care organizations and the IT service providers who support them. It gives hospitals, clinics, long-term care facilities, and their IT partners a common reference for configuring and assessing Microsoft 365 wherever electronic protected health information is handled. It was written with Critical Access Hospitals, Rural Emergency Hospitals, clinics, and long-term care facilities in mind, and it applies to any health care organization that uses Microsoft 365.
It differs from general-purpose Microsoft 365 benchmarks in four ways:
1) It is organized by the HIPAA Security Rule. Every control is placed under the Security Rule standard it most directly supports, so a privacy or security officer can read it in the same structure they already use.
2) It accounts for clinical reality. Controls note where hospital workflows collide with a setting, such as biomedical devices that send mail, shared clinical workstations, telehealth visits, and staff who cannot carry a phone on the floor, and say how to handle the collision without leaving a gap.
3) It scores on a graduated scale. A setting that falls short of the target still earns partial credit, and a setting stricter than the target earns bonus points. Real-world configurations are rarely all or nothing, and the score should reflect that.
4) It records decisions. Exclusions and accepted risks are documented in a standard format, so the record shows what was decided, by whom, and why.
HCSB is published as a family of editions, one per platform. This is the Microsoft 365 edition.
HCSB is a health care overlay. It works alongside the security guidance Microsoft publishes for its own products rather than replacing it, and it is not a Microsoft product.
Using this baseline supports, but does not by itself establish, HIPAA compliance. Compliance also depends on the organization's own policies, procedures, risk analysis, and workforce practices. This document is not legal advice.
How to Read a Control
Each control contains the following parts:
- ID and title. IDs take the form HCSB-SECTION-NN and do not change between versions. Retired controls keep their ID and are marked retired.
- Level. Core controls are expected in every tenant licensed for them. Enhanced controls go further, or depend on licensing beyond Entra ID P1.
- Priority and weight. Critical (weight 3), High (weight 2), or Standard (weight 1). Weight determines how much the control moves the overall score.
- License. The licensing the control depends on. See section 4.
- Assessment. Automated controls are read directly from tenant configuration. Manual controls are attested by the organization.
- HIPAA. The Security Rule standards and implementation specifications the control supports.
- Setting, Why it matters, and Health care considerations. What to configure, why, and where clinical operations change the picture.
- Permitted documented exclusions. The only exclusions that keep full credit when they are documented.
- Basis. The sources and visuaFUSION rationale the control rests on.
- Scoring. How observed configurations translate to points.
Levels, Priorities, and Licensing
| License key | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Any | Any Microsoft 365 or Office 365 plan with Exchange Online |
| Entra ID P1 | Microsoft Entra ID P1 (included in Microsoft 365 E3, E5, and Business Premium) |
| Entra ID P2 | Microsoft Entra ID P2 (included in Microsoft 365 E5, or add-on) |
| Intune | Microsoft Intune Plan 1 (included in Microsoft 365 E3, E5, and Business Premium) |
| Defender for Office 365 P1 | Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Plan 1 (included in Microsoft 365 E5 and Business Premium, or add-on) |
| Power BI or Fabric | Power BI or Microsoft Fabric in use |
| Hybrid identity only | Applies only to hybrid identity (on-premises Active Directory synchronized to Entra ID) |
A control the tenant is not licensed for is reported as licensing-gated and is left out of the score. It is not counted as a failure. Licensing decisions belong to the organization, and the score should not penalize a tenant for a product it does not own.
Scoring Method
4.1 Points per control
Every control is scored from 0 to 10 base points. Ten points means the setting meets the baseline target. Controls with a meaningful stricter-than-target setting can award up to 2 bonus points, for a maximum of 12.
Where a setting is a value on a scale, such as a session length, points step down as the value moves away from the target. A configured value that is weaker than the target still earns more than leaving the default in place, and explicitly setting a policy at the default value earns a small amount of credit, because a deliberate, documented setting is better than none.
4.2 Worked example: sign-in frequency for all users
The target for HCSB-SES-01 is 7 days. The scoring table is:
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| 12 hours or less (matches Microsoft's NIST AAL2 guidance) | 12 |
| 24 hours or less (matches NIST SP 800-63B Rev 4 AAL2) | 11 |
| 7 days or less (target) | 10 |
| 14 days or less | 7 |
| 30 days or less | 4 |
| Less than 90 days | 2 |
| 90 days (the Entra default), set explicitly by policy | 1 |
| Longer than 90 days | 0 |
| No enforced policy | 0 |
A tenant with an 8-day policy earns 7 points. At weight 2, that contributes 14 of a possible 20 points toward the baseline score, and the remaining gap is visible rather than hidden behind a pass or fail result.
4.3 Bonus points
Bonus points are reported separately as Above Baseline points. They are never added into the baseline score, so a very strict setting on one control cannot offset a gap on another.
Above Baseline points are weighted the same way as base points: a control's bonus points are multiplied by its weight. In this edition, 6 controls offer bonus points, for a maximum of +20 Above Baseline points:
- HCSB-AUTH-03: Require phishing-resistant authentication for administrators (up to +4)
- HCSB-SES-01: Require periodic reauthentication for all users (up to +4)
- HCSB-SES-02: Short sessions and non-persistent browsers for administrators (up to +4)
- HCSB-SES-03: Sign out idle web sessions (up to +2)
- HCSB-AUD-03: Retain audit and sign-in logs for at least one year (up to +4)
- HCSB-TRN-04: Enforce DMARC on every domain (up to +2)
4.4 Documented exclusions
Many controls permit specific, documented exclusions, such as emergency access accounts or a device account for a lab interface. A documented exclusion keeps full credit. Documentation must include:
1) The account, device, or object excluded
2) The reason
3) The compensating control, where the control calls for one
4) Who approved it and when
5) A review date no more than 12 months out
The following rules apply:
- An undocumented exclusion caps the control at 6 points and removes any bonus.
- An exclusion past its review date is treated as undocumented.
- Documented exclusions covering more than 10 percent of in-scope users cap the control at 8 points. At that size, an exclusion is a scope decision rather than an exception.
- Policies in report-only mode do not count as enforced.
4.5 Accepted risk
An organization may decide not to meet a target after weighing the risk against operational impact. That is a legitimate decision. Recording it as an accepted risk, with an owner, date, rationale, and review date, removes the control from the open gap list but does not change its points. The score reflects the configuration. The decision record explains it.
4.6 Overall scores
- Baseline score = the sum of (weight x base points, capped at 10) divided by the sum of (weight x 10), across all scored controls, as a percentage.
- Above Baseline points = the sum of (weight x bonus points).
- Scores are reported for Core controls (the headline), Enhanced controls, each HIPAA section, and each priority.
4.7 How a score is written
An HCSB result is written as the Baseline Score followed by Above Baseline points, for example 90% +6. The percentage is the Baseline Score, a percentage of the maximum weighted base points. The plus number is Above Baseline points. They are weighted bonus points, out of a maximum of +20 in this edition, so they are never written with a percent sign. A result of 90% +6 means the tenant earned 90 percent of the baseline and 6 of the 20 available bonus points. It does not mean 96 percent, and the two numbers are never added together.
More examples: 20% +0 is a tenant with large gaps and no settings stricter than the target. 45% +8 is a tenant with gaps that has still tightened a few settings beyond the target. The two numbers are independent, so a low Baseline Score can carry bonus points and a high one can show +0.
Example of how +6 is earned: HCSB-SES-01 set to 12 hours earns 12 points. Ten count toward the Baseline Score, and the 2 bonus points, multiplied by the control's weight of 2, add +4. A DMARC subdomain policy of reject under HCSB-TRN-04 adds 1 bonus point at weight 2, or +2. Together, +6.
An HCSB score is a point-in-time measure of a tenant's configuration under this baseline. It is not an audit, a certification, or a compliance rating.
45 CFR 164.312(d)
Person or Entity Authentication
Controls that confirm a person signing in is who they claim to be. This section carries the largest share of the score because account takeover is the most common path to a Microsoft 365 breach in health care.
14 controls in this section
Require multifactor authentication for every user
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(d) Person or entity authentication; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(D) Password management
Setting
An enforced Conditional Access policy requires multifactor authentication for all users and all cloud applications. Tenants without Entra ID P1 use Security Defaults instead.
Why it matters
A stolen password alone should never be enough to open a mailbox full of patient information. Requiring a second factor for everyone, not just administrators, closes the most common path attackers use to get into health care tenants.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Enforced Conditional Access policy covering all users and all cloud appsTarget | 10 |
| Security Defaults enabled (no Conditional Access) | 7 |
| Enforced policy covering at least 95 percent of member users | 8 |
| Enforced policy covering at least 75 percent of member users | 5 |
| Enforced policy covering fewer than 75 percent of member users | 3 |
| Policy exists in report-only mode | 1 |
| No policy and Security Defaults off | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Emergency access accounts registered under HCSB-ACC-01
- Device service accounts covered by HCSB-AUTH-05 with a location-restricted compensating policy
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: Conditional Access common policy requiring MFA for all users
- NIST SP 800-63B Rev 4: multifactor authentication at AAL2
- 45 CFR 164.312(d)
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /identity/conditionalAccess/policies (Policy.Read.All)
- Graph: GET /policies/identitySecurityDefaultsEnforcementPolicy
Require multifactor authentication for administrative roles
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(d) Person or entity authentication; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4) Information access management
Setting
An enforced Conditional Access policy targets every privileged directory role and requires multifactor authentication for all cloud applications.
Why it matters
Role-targeted policies keep protecting administrators even if someone later narrows the all-user policy. Administrative accounts hold the keys to every mailbox and file in the tenant.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Enforced policy targets all privileged rolesTarget | 10 |
| Enforced policy targets Global Administrator only | 5 |
| No role-targeted policy, but HCSB-AUTH-01 is fully enforced | 6 |
| No enforced policy covering administrators | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Emergency access accounts registered under HCSB-ACC-01
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: Conditional Access common policy requiring MFA for administrators
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /identity/conditionalAccess/policies (Policy.Read.All)
- Graph: GET /roleManagement/directory/roleDefinitions (RoleManagement.Read.Directory)
Require phishing-resistant authentication for administrators
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(d) Person or entity authentication
Setting
Conditional Access requires the phishing-resistant MFA authentication strength (FIDO2 security key, Windows Hello for Business, or certificate-based authentication) for privileged roles.
Why it matters
Adversary-in-the-middle phishing kits capture app approvals and one-time codes as easily as passwords. Phishing-resistant methods are bound to the real sign-in page and cannot be relayed.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Phishing-resistant strength required for all usersBonus | 12 |
| Phishing-resistant strength required for all privileged rolesTarget | 10 |
| Passwordless MFA strength required for privileged roles | 7 |
| Standard MFA only for privileged roles | 3 |
| No authentication strength requirement | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Emergency access accounts registered under HCSB-ACC-01 (which should themselves use FIDO2 keys)
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: Conditional Access authentication strengths (phishing-resistant MFA)
- NIST SP 800-63B Rev 4: phishing resistance
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /identity/conditionalAccess/policies (Policy.Read.All)
- Graph: GET /identity/conditionalAccess/authenticationStrength/policies (Policy.Read.All)
Block legacy authentication protocols
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(d) Person or entity authentication
Setting
An enforced Conditional Access policy blocks the Exchange ActiveSync and Other clients app types for all users. Any account excluded for a device that cannot use modern authentication is documented and restricted to trusted named locations by a separate policy.
Why it matters
Legacy protocols cannot perform multifactor authentication, so they let attackers bypass every other sign-in control with a password alone.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Enforced block for all users with no device exclusionsTarget | 10 |
| Enforced block with documented device exclusions restricted to trusted named locationsTarget | 10 |
| Enforced block with documented device exclusions that are not location-restricted | 8 |
| Block policy in report-only mode | 1 |
| No block policy | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Emergency access accounts registered under HCSB-ACC-01
- Documented device service accounts restricted to trusted named locations
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: block legacy authentication with Conditional Access
- visuaFUSION field experience with clinical device authentication
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /identity/conditionalAccess/policies (Policy.Read.All)
- Graph: GET /identity/conditionalAccess/namedLocations (Policy.Read.All)
Disable SMTP AUTH client submission except for documented device accounts
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(d) Person or entity authentication; 45 CFR 164.312(e)(1) Transmission security
Setting
SMTP AUTH client submission is disabled at the organization level. Devices that send mail use an IP-restricted inbound connector (SMTP relay) where possible. Any mailbox with SMTP AUTH re-enabled is a documented device account that uses OAuth, or a documented, time-limited exception while the device is moved to relay.
Why it matters
SMTP AUTH is a common target for password spraying because it accepts a username and password with no second factor. Microsoft is disabling Basic authentication for SMTP AUTH by default, so devices that depend on it need a supported path either way.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Disabled at the organization level with no mailbox exceptionsTarget | 10 |
| Disabled at the organization level; every exception documented and using OAuthTarget | 10 |
| Disabled at the organization level; documented exceptions still using Basic authentication | 7 |
| Enabled at the organization level but explicitly disabled on at least 95 percent of user mailboxes | 5 |
| Enabled at the organization level | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Documented device mailboxes, each with device, location, owner, authentication method, and review date
Basis
- Microsoft Exchange Team: SMTP AUTH Basic authentication deprecation (MC786329 and January 27, 2026 timeline update)
- Microsoft Learn: enable or disable SMTP AUTH; configure a connector to relay mail
How it is assessed
- Exchange: Get-TransportConfig (SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled)
- Exchange: Get-CASMailbox (SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled per mailbox)
- Exchange admin center: SMTP AUTH clients report (authentication protocol column); verify API availability
Block device code flow and authentication transfer
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(d) Person or entity authentication
Setting
An enforced Conditional Access policy blocks the device code flow and authentication transfer authentication flows for all users, with documented exclusions for shared-display devices that require device code sign-in.
Why it matters
Device code phishing tricks a user into approving a sign-in for an attacker's device, and it bypasses most MFA prompts. Very few users ever need either flow.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Device code flow blocked for all users | 6 |
| Authentication transfer blocked for all users | 4 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Emergency access accounts registered under HCSB-ACC-01
- Documented shared-display device accounts
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: Conditional Access authentication flows (device code flow and authentication transfer)
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /identity/conditionalAccess/policies (Policy.Read.All), conditions.authenticationFlows
Disable weak authentication methods
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(d) Person or entity authentication
Setting
The authentication methods policy disables SMS, voice call, and email one-time passcode as sign-in or MFA methods for members, and Microsoft Authenticator shows number matching and sign-in context.
Why it matters
SMS and voice codes can be intercepted or redirected through SIM swapping, and email codes are only as strong as the mailbox they land in.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| SMS disabled or restricted to a documented transition group | 4 |
| Voice call disabled | 3 |
| Email one-time passcode disabled for members | 3 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Documented user groups with a dated transition plan off SMS
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: authentication methods policy
- NIST SP 800-63B Rev 4: restrictions on authenticators using the public telephone network
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /policies/authenticationMethodsPolicy (Policy.Read.All)
Every active user is registered for multifactor authentication
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(d) Person or entity authentication
Setting
Every enabled member user has finished registering a strong method for multifactor authentication.
Why it matters
An MFA policy only protects accounts that have finished registering. Unregistered accounts can be claimed by whoever registers first, including an attacker holding the password.
Scoring
Measured: Percent of enabled member users registered for MFA
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| 100 percentTarget | 10 |
| 98 percent or more | 9 |
| 95 percent or more | 8 |
| 90 percent or more | 6 |
| 75 percent or more | 4 |
| Above 0 percent | 2 |
| 0 percent | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Documented service accounts
- Disabled or unlicensed accounts are not counted
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: authentication methods registration reporting and Temporary Access Pass
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /reports/authenticationMethods/userRegistrationDetails (AuditLog.Read.All)
Use a custom banned password list and smart lockout
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(D) Password management; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) Log-in monitoring
Setting
Entra password protection enforces a custom banned password list of at least five organization-specific terms. Smart lockout locks an account after 10 or fewer failed attempts for at least 60 seconds.
Why it matters
People build passwords from what is around them. Blocking the facility's own name and town stops the guesses an attacker tries first.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Custom banned password list enforced with at least five terms | 6 |
| Lockout threshold of 10 or fewer | 2 |
| Lockout duration of at least 60 seconds | 2 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: smart lockout defaults of 10 failed attempts and a 60-second lockout
- Microsoft Learn: custom banned password list
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /settings (directory setting template Password Rule Settings); verify endpoint (Directory.Read.All)
Enforce password protection on on-premises Active Directory
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(D) Password management
Setting
Entra password protection for Windows Server Active Directory is enabled in Enforced mode, so the banned password lists apply to password changes made on premises.
Why it matters
In a hybrid environment most passwords are set on premises. Without this, the cloud banned list only covers the few passwords changed in the cloud.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Enabled in Enforced modeTarget | 10 |
| Enabled in Audit mode | 4 |
| Disabled | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Entra password protection for on-premises AD DS
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /settings (EnableBannedPasswordCheckOnPremises, BannedPasswordCheckOnPremisesMode); verify endpoint
Do not force periodic password expiration
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(D) Password management
Setting
Cloud passwords are set not to expire on a schedule. Passwords are changed when there is reason to believe they were exposed, and banned password lists and MFA carry the protection instead.
Why it matters
Current NIST guidance says verifiers should not require periodic password changes, because forced rotation produces predictable patterns such as Spring2026 followed by Summer2026.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Passwords never expireTarget | 10 |
| Expiration of 365 days or more | 6 |
| Expiration of 180 to 364 days | 4 |
| Expiration of less than 180 days | 3 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: password policy recommendations for Microsoft 365 (passwords set to never expire)
- NIST SP 800-63B Rev 4: no required periodic password change
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /domains (passwordValidityPeriodInDays) (Domain.Read.All)
Respond automatically to risky sign-ins and risky users
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) Log-in monitoring; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) Information system activity review
Setting
Conditional Access blocks or requires MFA for medium and high sign-in risk, and requires a secure password change for high user risk.
Why it matters
Microsoft's risk detections spot leaked credentials, impossible travel, and token replay that no fixed rule can see. An automatic response stops the attempt while it is happening instead of after someone reads a report.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Sign-in risk policy enforced for medium and high | 5 |
| User risk policy enforced for high | 5 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Emergency access accounts registered under HCSB-ACC-01
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: risk-based Conditional Access policies for sign-in risk and user risk
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /identity/conditionalAccess/policies (signInRiskLevels, userRiskLevels)
Protect security information registration
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(d) Person or entity authentication
Setting
Conditional Access requires a managed device or a trusted named location before a user can register or change authentication methods.
Why it matters
An attacker holding a password tries to register their own phone as the second factor. Limiting where registration can happen blocks that move.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Managed or compliant device requiredTarget | 10 |
| Trusted named location required | 9 |
| MFA required to register, no device or location condition | 4 |
| No registration policy | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Emergency access accounts registered under HCSB-ACC-01
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: Conditional Access for registering security information
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /identity/conditionalAccess/policies (userAction registerSecurityInfo)
Synchronize password hashes in hybrid environments
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(d) Person or entity authentication; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(7) Contingency plan
Setting
Entra Connect synchronizes password hashes, even if another method is the primary sign-in path.
Why it matters
Password hash sync enables leaked credential detection and gives the organization a cloud sign-in fallback if on-premises authentication is down.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Configured as statedTarget | 10 |
| Not configured | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: password hash synchronization (leaked credential detection and backup sign-in)
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /directory/onPremisesSynchronization (features.passwordSyncEnabled); verify endpoint (OnPremDirectorySynchronization.Read.All)
45 CFR 164.312(a)(1)
Access Control
Controls that limit who holds administrative power, which devices and applications can reach organizational data, and how emergency access works.
9 controls in this section
Provide break-glass administrative access
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(ii) Emergency access procedure
Setting
Two cloud-only emergency access accounts with the Global Administrator role exist, are registered in the platform, use phishing-resistant credentials, are excluded from Conditional Access by documentation, and generate an alert whenever they sign in.
Why it matters
HIPAA requires an emergency access procedure. For Microsoft 365, that means a guaranteed way back in when MFA, federation, or a Conditional Access mistake locks everyone else out.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Two accounts registered | 4 |
| Both accounts cloud-only | 2 |
| Sign-in alert configured and tested | 2 |
| Phishing-resistant credentials and documented storage | 2 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: manage emergency access accounts (two or more, cloud-only, phishing-resistant credentials, sign-in monitoring)
- 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(ii)
How it is assessed
- Platform registration of the two accounts
- Graph: GET /users/{id} (onPremisesSyncEnabled)
- Manual attestation: alerting and storage
Limit Global Administrators to fewer than five, with at least two
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(3) Workforce security; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4) Information access management
Setting
At least two and fewer than five accounts hold the Global Administrator role, not counting the emergency access accounts.
Why it matters
With only one administrator, nobody can step in when that person is unavailable. Five or more widens the target and usually means people hold the role for convenience.
Scoring
Measured: Global Administrator count, excluding emergency access accounts
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| 2 to 4Target | 10 |
| 5 | 7 |
| 6 or 7 | 4 |
| 1 | 3 |
| 8 or more | 1 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Emergency access accounts registered under HCSB-ACC-01 are not counted
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: best practices for Microsoft Entra roles (Global Administrator assigned to fewer than five people)
- Microsoft Learn: critical impact accounts guidance (at least two accounts for business continuity)
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /roleManagement/directory/roleAssignments (RoleManagement.Read.Directory)
Use dedicated, cloud-only administrative accounts
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4) Information access management; 45 CFR 164.312(a)(1) Access control
Setting
Every account holding a privileged role is a separate account from the person's daily account, is cloud-only rather than synchronized from on premises, and carries no license that includes a mailbox or productivity apps.
Why it matters
Daily accounts read email and browse the web, which is how they get compromised. A synchronized administrator also means a compromise of on-premises Active Directory extends straight into the tenant.
Scoring
Measured: Percent of privileged accounts meeting all three conditions
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| 100 percentTarget | 10 |
| 75 percent or more | 6 |
| 50 percent or more | 4 |
| Above 0 percent | 2 |
| 0 percent | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: securing privileged access (separate, cloud-only administrative accounts)
How it is assessed
- Graph: role assignments joined to users (onPremisesSyncEnabled, assignedLicenses)
Assign privileged roles just in time
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4) Information access management; 45 CFR 164.312(a)(1) Access control
Setting
Privileged roles are assigned as eligible through Privileged Identity Management and activated when needed, with approval required for Global Administrator activation.
Why it matters
Standing administrator access is available to an attacker at all times. Just-in-time activation limits the window and creates a record of every use.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| All privileged assignments are eligible rather than active | 7 |
| Approval required for Global Administrator activation | 3 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Emergency access accounts registered under HCSB-ACC-01
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /roleManagement/directory/roleEligibilitySchedules and roleAssignmentSchedules (RoleManagement.Read.Directory)
Control application consent and registration
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4) Information access management; 45 CFR 164.312(a)(1) Access control
Setting
Users cannot grant applications access to organizational data, an admin consent workflow handles requests, and users cannot register applications or create new tenants.
Why it matters
Consent phishing gets a user to approve a malicious app that keeps reading mail even after the password is changed. Routing consent through an administrator stops it.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| User consent disabled (4), or limited to verified publishers for low-risk permissions (2) | 4 |
| Admin consent workflow enabled with reviewers | 3 |
| Users cannot register applications | 2 |
| Non-admin users cannot create tenants | 1 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: configure user consent and the admin consent workflow
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /policies/authorizationPolicy (Policy.Read.All)
- Graph: GET /policies/adminConsentRequestPolicy (Policy.Read.All)
Restrict device join and local administrator rights
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(a)(1) Access control; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4) Information access management
Setting
Only designated users or groups can join devices to Entra ID, Global Administrators are not added as local administrators on joined devices, Windows LAPS is enabled, and users cannot read BitLocker recovery keys for their own devices.
Why it matters
Unrestricted device join lets anyone with a password add an unmanaged device to the organization. Shared local administrator passwords let one compromised workstation unlock the rest.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Device join limited to designated users or groups | 4 |
| Global Administrator not added as local administrator | 2 |
| Windows LAPS enabled | 2 |
| Users cannot read their own BitLocker keys | 2 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: device registration settings and Windows LAPS with Microsoft Entra ID
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /policies/deviceRegistrationPolicy (Policy.Read.All)
- Graph: GET /policies/authorizationPolicy (allowedToReadBitlockerKeysForOwnedDevice)
Reach shared mailboxes only through individual accounts
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(i) Unique user identification
Setting
Every shared mailbox has its user account blocked from signing in, so access happens only through individual users with delegated permission.
Why it matters
HIPAA requires unique user identification. A shared mailbox someone signs into directly has a shared password and no record of who did what.
Scoring
Measured: Percent of shared mailboxes with sign-in blocked
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| 100 percentTarget | 10 |
| 90 percent or more | 7 |
| 75 percent or more | 5 |
| Above 0 percent | 2 |
| 0 percent | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: shared mailboxes (blocking sign-in to the shared mailbox account)
- 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(i)
How it is assessed
- Exchange: Get-EXOMailbox -RecipientTypeDetails SharedMailbox
- Graph: GET /users/{id} (accountEnabled)
Require a managed device for access to organizational data
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(a)(1) Access control; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4) Information access management
Setting
Conditional Access requires a compliant or hybrid-joined device for access from Windows and macOS, and limits unmanaged devices to browser-only access with app-enforced restrictions or blocks them.
Why it matters
A valid password on an unmanaged home computer can download a whole mailbox. Device requirements keep organizational data on devices the organization controls.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Managed device required for all users on desktop platformsTarget | 10 |
| Required for administrators; unmanaged devices limited to browser-only access | 7 |
| Required for administrators only | 4 |
| No device requirement | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Emergency access accounts registered under HCSB-ACC-01
- Documented device service accounts
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: Conditional Access requiring compliant or hybrid-joined devices, and app-enforced restrictions
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /identity/conditionalAccess/policies (grantControls compliantDevice, domainJoinedDevice; sessionControls applicationEnforcedRestrictions)
Protect organizational data on personal mobile devices
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(a)(1) Access control; 45 CFR 164.312(e)(2)(ii) Encryption
Setting
Personal phones and tablets reach Microsoft 365 only through approved apps under an Intune app protection policy, enforced by Conditional Access, and personal device enrollment is blocked by default.
Why it matters
App protection keeps patient information inside managed apps, blocks copying it to personal apps, and allows a selective wipe when someone leaves, without managing the whole phone.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| App protection policies for iOS and Android cover Outlook and Teams | 5 |
| Conditional Access requires an app protection policy on mobile platforms | 3 |
| Personal device enrollment blocked by default | 2 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: Intune app protection policies and Conditional Access requiring app protection
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /deviceAppManagement/managedAppPolicies (DeviceManagementApps.Read.All)
- Graph: GET /identity/conditionalAccess/policies (compliantApplication grant)
- Graph: GET /deviceManagement/deviceEnrollmentConfigurations (DeviceManagementServiceConfig.Read.All)
45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(iii)
Automatic Logoff and Session Control
Controls that limit how long a signed-in session stays valid. Every setting in this section is balanced against clinical workflow, and the targets were chosen so that a full shift is never interrupted by a routine prompt.
4 controls in this section
Require periodic reauthentication for all users
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(iii) Automatic logoff; 45 CFR 164.312(d) Person or entity authentication
Setting
An enforced Conditional Access policy sets a sign-in frequency of 7 days or less for all users and all cloud applications.
Why it matters
Without a sign-in frequency policy, Entra ID keeps sessions alive on a rolling 90-day window, so a stolen session token can stay useful for months. Periodic reauthentication caps that window and forces Conditional Access to re-evaluate the user, the device, and the risk on a regular schedule.
Alignment with published guidance
| Source | Value | HCSB scoring |
|---|---|---|
| Microsoft Entra ID default (no policy) | Rolling 90 days | 1 point when set explicitly by policy |
| HCSB target | 7 days | 10 points |
| NIST SP 800-63B Rev 4, AAL2 overall reauthentication timeout | 24 hours | 11 points (bonus) |
| Microsoft guidance for configuring Entra ID to meet NIST AAL2 | 12 hours | 12 points (bonus) |
Why HCSB sets it here. Microsoft's general guidance on reauthentication prompts favors single sign-on and managed devices over frequent prompts for all users, and cautions that frequent prompts hurt productivity and teach people to enter credentials without thinking. The 24-hour and 12-hour values apply when an organization deliberately operates at NIST Authenticator Assurance Level 2. HCSB sets 7 days for all users because it cuts the default 90-day window by more than 90 percent while guaranteeing that no clinician, on any shift length, is pulled away from patient care by a routine prompt. Organizations that choose AAL2-aligned intervals earn bonus points for it. This control is one layer: administrators run on a 3-hour window (HCSB-SES-02), and managed device requirements (HCSB-ACC-08) and risk-based policies (HCSB-AUTH-12) address token theft directly.
Scoring
Measured: Effective sign-in frequency for all users
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| 12 hours or less (matches Microsoft's NIST AAL2 guidance)Bonus | 12 |
| 24 hours or less (matches NIST SP 800-63B Rev 4 AAL2)Bonus | 11 |
| 7 days or lessTarget | 10 |
| 14 days or less | 7 |
| 30 days or less | 4 |
| Less than 90 days | 2 |
| 90 days (the Entra default), set explicitly by policy | 1 |
| Longer than 90 days | 0 |
| No enforced policy | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Emergency access accounts registered under HCSB-ACC-01
Basis
- visuaFUSION rationale: clinical shift coverage and reduction of the default 90-day window (see Why HCSB sets it here)
- NIST SP 800-63B Rev 4: AAL2 reauthentication timeout
- Microsoft Learn: reauthentication prompts and session lifetime; NIST AAL2 configuration guidance
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /identity/conditionalAccess/policies (sessionControls.signInFrequency) (Policy.Read.All)
Short sessions and non-persistent browsers for administrators
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(iii) Automatic logoff; 45 CFR 164.312(d) Person or entity authentication
Setting
An enforced Conditional Access policy for privileged roles sets a sign-in frequency of 3 hours or less and sets browser sessions to never persist.
Why it matters
An administrator session token is the most valuable thing an attacker can steal. Short sessions and no saved browser cookies leave little to take.
Alignment with published guidance
| Source | Value | HCSB scoring |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-63B Rev 4, AAL2 overall reauthentication timeout | 24 hours | 4 points |
| NIST SP 800-63B Rev 4, AAL3 overall reauthentication timeout | 12 hours | 6 points |
| Microsoft guidance for configuring Entra ID to meet NIST AAL2 | 12 hours | 6 points |
| HCSB target | 3 hours | 10 points |
Why HCSB sets it here. Administrators work at a desk rather than on a clinical floor, and an administrator session token is the most valuable credential in the tenant. HCSB holds administrators to a window well inside both the NIST and Microsoft values, because the operational cost is small and the exposure is large.
Scoring
Measured: Effective sign-in frequency for privileged roles
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| 1 hour or lessBonus | 12 |
| 2 hours or lessBonus | 11 |
| 3 hours or lessTarget | 10 |
| 4 hours or less | 9 |
| 8 hours or less | 7 |
| 12 hours or less | 6 |
| 24 hours or less | 4 |
| 7 days or less | 2 |
| More than 7 days, set by policy | 1 |
| No enforced policy | 0 |
| Cap: Persistent browser session not set to Never | max 7 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Emergency access accounts registered under HCSB-ACC-01
Basis
- visuaFUSION rationale: administrator session exposure (see Why HCSB sets it here)
- NIST SP 800-63B Rev 4: AAL3 reauthentication timeout
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /identity/conditionalAccess/policies (sessionControls.signInFrequency, persistentBrowser)
Sign out idle web sessions
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(iii) Automatic logoff
Setting
The Microsoft 365 idle session timeout signs users out of web apps after 60 minutes of inactivity or less.
Why it matters
A browser left open on a shared or public computer is an open door to the mailbox. Idle sign-out closes it.
Scoring
Measured: Idle session timeout
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| 15 minutes or lessBonus | 12 |
| 30 minutes or lessBonus | 11 |
| 60 minutes or lessTarget | 10 |
| 3 hours or less | 7 |
| 8 hours or less | 4 |
| More than 8 hours | 2 |
| No enforced policy | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- NIST SP 800-63B Rev 4: AAL2 inactivity timeout of 1 hour
- Microsoft Learn: idle session timeout for Microsoft 365 web apps
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /policies/activityBasedTimeoutPolicies (Policy.Read.All)
Require a fresh sign-in to enroll a device
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(d) Person or entity authentication
Setting
Conditional Access sets sign-in frequency to Every time for the Microsoft Intune Enrollment application.
Why it matters
Requiring a fresh sign-in stops a stolen session from enrolling an attacker's device as a trusted, managed device.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Configured as statedTarget | 10 |
| Not configured | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: requiring reauthentication for Intune device enrollment
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /identity/conditionalAccess/policies
45 CFR 164.308(a)(4)
Information Access Management and External Collaboration
Controls that govern what leaves the organization through sharing and collaboration, whether with referral partners, payers, vendors, or patients.
7 controls in this section
Limit guest invitations and guest directory access
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4) Information access management
Setting
Only administrators and users in the Guest Inviter role can invite guests, invitations are limited to an allowlist of partner domains, and guests have restricted access to directory information.
Why it matters
Open invitations let any user bring outside parties into Teams and SharePoint, where patient information lives.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Invitations limited to admins and Guest Inviter role | 4 |
| Invitations limited to allowlisted domains | 3 |
| Guest directory access set to most restricted | 3 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: B2B external collaboration settings and domain allow lists
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /policies/authorizationPolicy (allowInvitesFrom, guestUserRoleId)
- Graph: GET /policies/crossTenantAccessPolicy and B2B management policy; verify allowlist source
Restrict SharePoint and OneDrive external sharing
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4) Information access management; 45 CFR 164.312(a)(1) Access control
Setting
Anyone links are disabled. External sharing is limited to existing guests, or to new and existing guests from allowlisted domains. OneDrive sharing is no more permissive than SharePoint.
Why it matters
An Anyone link works for whoever holds it, with no sign-in and no record of who opened it.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| External sharing disabled (organization only)Target | 10 |
| Existing guests onlyTarget | 10 |
| New and existing guests, limited to allowlisted domains | 9 |
| New and existing guests, any domain | 6 |
| Anyone links allowed | 1 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Documented sites with a business need for broader sharing (for example, a public-facing board packet site with no PHI)
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: SharePoint and OneDrive external sharing overview
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /admin/sharepoint/settings (sharingCapability, sharingDomainRestrictionMode) (SharePointTenantSettings.Read.All)
Set safe sharing defaults and guest expiration
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4) Information access management
Setting
The default sharing link is Specific people or Only people in your organization with view permission, guest access to sites expires within 90 days, and guests cannot reshare items they do not own.
Why it matters
Defaults decide what most people share, because most people never change them.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Default link type is Specific people or organization-only | 4 |
| Guest access expires in 90 days or less | 3 |
| Guests cannot reshare items they do not own | 3 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: default sharing links and guest access expiration in SharePoint
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /admin/sharepoint/settings; some properties require SharePoint Online Management Shell; verify app-only coverage
Limit Teams external communication to known partners
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4) Information access management; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) Protection from malicious software
Setting
Teams external access is limited to allowlisted domains, communication with unmanaged consumer Teams accounts is disabled, and trial tenants are blocked.
Why it matters
Attackers use open Teams federation to message staff directly while posing as IT support.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| External access limited to allowlisted domains | 5 |
| Unmanaged consumer Teams communication disabled | 3 |
| Trial tenants blocked | 2 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: Teams external access and federation settings
How it is assessed
- Teams PowerShell: Get-CsTenantFederationConfiguration; verify app-only support
Secure Teams meetings, including telehealth
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4) Information access management; 45 CFR 164.312(a)(1) Access control
Setting
Only people in the organization bypass the lobby, dial-in callers wait in the lobby, anonymous participants cannot start meetings or chat, only organizers and co-organizers present, and external participants cannot take control. Anonymous join is permitted only where telehealth requires it.
Why it matters
Meeting defaults decide who can walk into a meeting and what they can see once inside.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Only organization members bypass the lobby | 3 |
| Dial-in callers wait in the lobby | 2 |
| Anonymous participants cannot start meetings or use chat | 2 |
| Only organizers and co-organizers present | 2 |
| External participants cannot give or request control | 1 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: Teams meeting policies and lobby settings; Teams Virtual Appointments
How it is assessed
- Teams PowerShell: Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy; verify app-only support
Keep organizational mail out of personal accounts and add-ins
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4) Information access management; 45 CFR 164.312(e)(1) Transmission security
Setting
Users cannot add personal email accounts or calendars to Outlook, cannot connect third-party storage in Outlook on the web or Microsoft 365 on the web, and cannot install Outlook add-ins on their own.
Why it matters
Each of these moves organizational data into a place the organization cannot see or control. Add-ins can read every message a user opens.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Personal accounts and calendars disabled | 4 |
| Third-party storage restricted | 3 |
| User add-in installation disabled | 3 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Documented, administrator-deployed add-ins
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: Outlook on the web mailbox policies and Outlook add-in role assignments
How it is assessed
- Exchange: Get-OwaMailboxPolicy (PersonalAccountsEnabled, PersonalAccountCalendarsEnabled, AdditionalStorageProvidersAvailable)
- Exchange: Get-RoleAssignmentPolicy (My Custom Apps, My Marketplace Apps, My ReadWriteMailbox Apps)
Restrict Power BI and Fabric publishing and external sharing
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4) Information access management; 45 CFR 164.312(a)(1) Access control
Setting
Publish to web is disabled or limited to a security group, guest access and external sharing are restricted, and shareable links to everyone in the organization are restricted.
Why it matters
Publish to web makes a report public on the internet with no sign-in at all.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Publish to web disabled or limited to a security group | 5 |
| Guest access and external sharing restricted | 3 |
| Organization-wide shareable links restricted | 2 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Fabric admin portal tenant settings (Publish to web and external sharing)
How it is assessed
- Manual attestation until Fabric admin API collection is added
45 CFR 164.312(b)
Audit Controls and Activity Review
Controls that make sure activity is recorded, retained, and actually reviewed by someone.
4 controls in this section
Turn on unified audit logging
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(b) Audit controls; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) Information system activity review
Setting
Unified audit log ingestion is enabled and organization-wide mailbox auditing is not disabled.
Why it matters
Without the audit log there is no way to answer the first question after a suspected breach: what did the attacker access?
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Unified audit log ingestion enabled | 7 |
| Organization-wide mailbox auditing not disabled | 3 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: turn auditing on or off (unified audit log)
- 45 CFR 164.312(b)
How it is assessed
- Exchange: Get-AdminAuditLogConfig (UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled)
- Exchange: Get-OrganizationConfig (AuditDisabled)
Audit every mailbox with no bypass
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(b) Audit controls
Setting
Mailbox auditing records owner, delegate, and administrator actions, including access to message contents, and no mailbox has audit bypass enabled.
Why it matters
Audit bypass hides an account's activity from the log entirely, which is exactly what an attacker or a careless integration would want.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Required audit actions configured for owner, delegate, and admin | 6 |
| No mailbox has audit bypass enabled | 4 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: manage mailbox auditing
How it is assessed
- Exchange: Get-EXOMailbox (AuditEnabled, AuditOwner, AuditDelegate, AuditAdmin)
- Exchange: Get-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation
Retain audit and sign-in logs for at least one year
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(b) Audit controls; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) Information system activity review
Setting
Audit and Entra sign-in logs are retained for at least one year, through an audit retention policy, an export to log storage, or a SIEM.
Why it matters
Breaches are often discovered months after they start. Logs that roll off after 30 or 180 days are gone when the investigation needs them.
Scoring
Measured: Shortest retention across audit and sign-in logs
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| 6 years or moreBonus | 12 |
| 2 years or moreBonus | 11 |
| 1 year or moreTarget | 10 |
| 180 days or more | 5 |
| 90 days or more | 3 |
| 30 days or more | 1 |
| No enforced policy | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: audit log retention policies
- visuaFUSION rationale: one-year target for breach investigation timelines
How it is assessed
- Security and Compliance: Get-UnifiedAuditLogRetentionPolicy
- Manual attestation: export destination and retention period for Entra sign-in logs
Review sign-in and audit activity on a schedule
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) Information system activity review; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) Log-in monitoring
Setting
Someone reviews risky sign-ins, administrator activity, new inbox rules, and mail forwarding changes at least monthly, and the review is recorded.
Why it matters
HIPAA requires regular review of information system activity. Logs nobody reads do not meet that requirement.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Attested with supporting evidence on fileTarget | 10 |
| Attested without supporting evidence | 6 |
| Partially in place | 4 |
| Not attested | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) information system activity review
How it is assessed
- Manual attestation with review records
45 CFR 164.312(e)(1)
Transmission Security and Email Integrity
Controls that protect information leaving the organization by email and prevent others from sending mail that appears to come from the organization.
8 controls in this section
Block automatic forwarding to external addresses
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(e)(1) Transmission security; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4) Information access management
Setting
The outbound spam policy sets automatic forwarding to Off, remote domains do not allow auto-forward, and no transport rule redirects mail externally, except documented exceptions.
Why it matters
Attackers who get into a mailbox set up quiet forwarding so they keep receiving mail after they are locked out. Staff also forward work mail to personal accounts for convenience, which is a disclosure on its own.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Outbound spam policy automatic forwarding set to Off | 6 |
| Remote domain auto-forward disabled | 2 |
| No undocumented transport rules forwarding externally | 2 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Documented business forwarding to a specific partner address
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: control automatic external email forwarding with outbound spam policies
How it is assessed
- Exchange: Get-HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy (AutoForwardingMode)
- Exchange: Get-RemoteDomain (AutoForwardEnabled)
- Exchange: Get-TransportRule (RedirectMessageTo, BlindCopyTo to external)
Encrypt outbound email containing patient information
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(e)(1) Transmission security; 45 CFR 164.312(e)(2)(ii) Encryption
Setting
An email encryption capability is in place for messages containing PHI, through Microsoft Purview Message Encryption or a third-party encryption service, with an automatic trigger such as a keyword, sensitivity label, or data loss prevention rule.
Why it matters
Standard email travels between organizations with no guarantee of encryption at every hop. Encryption with an automatic trigger protects messages even when the sender forgets.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Encryption available with an automatic trigger (keyword, label, or DLP)Target | 10 |
| Encryption available but user-initiated only | 7 |
| No encryption capability | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- 45 CFR 164.312(e)(2)(ii)
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Purview Message Encryption
How it is assessed
- Exchange: Get-IRMConfiguration and Get-TransportRule (ApplyRightsProtectionTemplate, ApplyOME)
- Manual attestation for third-party services
Publish SPF and enable DKIM for every sending domain
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(e)(1) Transmission security; 45 CFR 164.312(c)(1) Integrity
Setting
Every domain that sends mail publishes an SPF record ending in a fail or softfail mechanism, and DKIM signing is enabled in Exchange Online for every custom domain.
Why it matters
SPF and DKIM are how receiving servers verify that mail claiming to come from the organization really did.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| SPF published for all sending domains | 5 |
| DKIM enabled for all custom domains | 5 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Parked domains that never send mail (covered by HCSB-TRN-04)
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: set up SPF and DKIM for Exchange Online
How it is assessed
- DNS: TXT lookup for SPF
- Exchange: Get-DkimSigningConfig
Enforce DMARC on every domain
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(e)(1) Transmission security; 45 CFR 164.312(c)(1) Integrity
Setting
Every domain publishes a DMARC record with a policy of quarantine or reject at 100 percent, with aggregate reporting sent to a monitored destination. Domains that never send mail publish reject.
Why it matters
DMARC tells the rest of the internet what to do with mail that fails SPF and DKIM. Without enforcement, anyone can send mail that appears to come from the hospital.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| p=reject at 100 percent on all domainsTarget | 10 |
| p=quarantine at 100 percent on all domains | 8 |
| Enforcement at less than 100 percent, or on only some domains | 5 |
| p=none with aggregate reporting | 3 |
| p=none without reporting | 2 |
| No DMARC record | 0 |
| Bonus: Subdomain policy (sp) is also reject on every domainBonus | +1 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: set up DMARC for Exchange Online
- CISA Binding Operational Directive 18-01 (DMARC reject policy)
How it is assessed
- DNS: TXT lookup for _dmarc records
Do not let mail flow rules or allow lists bypass filtering
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(c)(1) Integrity; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) Protection from malicious software
Setting
No transport rule sets the spam confidence level to bypass filtering for a sender domain, the connection filter IP allow list and safe list are unused, and inbound anti-spam policies contain no allowed domains, except documented exceptions.
Why it matters
Allowlisting a domain also allowlists anyone who spoofs or compromises that domain.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| No undocumented transport rules bypassing filtering | 4 |
| Connection filter IP allow list and safe list unused | 3 |
| No undocumented allowed sender domains | 3 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
- Documented exceptions with sender, reason, and review date
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: guidance on allow lists, connection filtering, and mail flow rules that bypass filtering
How it is assessed
- Exchange: Get-TransportRule (SetSCL -1)
- Exchange: Get-HostedConnectionFilterPolicy (IPAllowList, EnableSafeList)
- Exchange: Get-HostedContentFilterPolicy (AllowedSenderDomains)
Identify mail from external senders
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) Protection from malicious software
Setting
Outlook's native external sender identification is enabled.
Why it matters
A visible External tag is the simplest reminder that a message claiming to be from the CEO came from outside.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Configured as statedTarget | 10 |
| Not configured | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: external sender identification in Outlook
How it is assessed
- Exchange: Get-ExternalInOutlook
Reject unauthenticated Direct Send
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(c)(1) Integrity; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) Protection from malicious software
Setting
Exchange Online rejects Direct Send messages that are not received through a configured connector.
Why it matters
Direct Send lets anyone on the internet submit mail that appears internal. Attackers use it for convincing internal phishing.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Configured as statedTarget | 10 |
| Not configured | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: Direct Send and rejecting unauthenticated Direct Send
How it is assessed
- Exchange: Get-OrganizationConfig (RejectDirectSend)
Detect and act on patient information in outbound content
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.312(e)(1) Transmission security; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) Risk management
Setting
A data loss prevention policy for Exchange, SharePoint, and OneDrive detects health and identity information, such as Social Security numbers and medical record identifiers, and is in enforcement mode with an encrypt, block, or override-with-justification action.
Why it matters
DLP catches the message the sender did not realize contained patient information, and creates a record of what left.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Enforced with encrypt, block, or override actionTarget | 10 |
| Enforced with notification only | 7 |
| Policy in test or simulation mode | 3 |
| No DLP policy for health information | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Purview data loss prevention
- 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B)
How it is assessed
- Security and Compliance: Get-DlpCompliancePolicy and Get-DlpComplianceRule; verify license coverage per workload
45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B)
Protection from Malicious Software
Controls that filter malicious attachments, links, and impersonation attempts before they reach the workforce.
5 controls in this section
Block dangerous attachment types
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) Protection from malicious software
Setting
The anti-malware policy has the common attachment filter on, uses an expanded list of executable and script file types, and notifies administrators when internal users send malware.
Why it matters
Clinical and business staff rarely have a reason to receive executables or scripts by email, and attackers rely on them.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Common attachment filter enabled | 5 |
| Expanded file type list in use | 3 |
| Administrator notification for internal malware senders | 2 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: anti-malware policies and the common attachments filter
How it is assessed
- Exchange: Get-MalwareFilterPolicy (EnableFileFilter, FileTypes, EnableInternalSenderAdminNotifications)
Configure anti-phishing and spoof protection
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) Protection from malicious software
Setting
An anti-phishing policy applies to all recipients with spoof intelligence on, unauthenticated sender indicators shown, and the first contact safety tip enabled.
Why it matters
Spoof protection catches the lookalike messages that pass basic spam filtering.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Policy applies to all recipients | 4 |
| Spoof intelligence and unauthenticated sender indicators on | 4 |
| First contact safety tip on | 2 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: anti-phishing policies in Exchange Online Protection
How it is assessed
- Exchange: Get-AntiPhishPolicy and Get-AntiPhishRule
Protect leaders and the organization's domains from impersonation
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) Protection from malicious software
Setting
Defender for Office 365 impersonation protection covers senior leaders and finance staff, the organization's own domains, and mailbox intelligence.
Why it matters
Wire fraud and payroll diversion almost always impersonate a named leader or a familiar domain.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Targeted user protection covers leadership and finance | 4 |
| Organization domain protection on | 3 |
| Mailbox intelligence protection on | 3 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: impersonation protection in Defender for Office 365
How it is assessed
- Exchange: Get-AntiPhishPolicy (EnableTargetedUserProtection, EnableOrganizationDomainsProtection, EnableMailboxIntelligenceProtection)
Turn on Safe Links and Safe Attachments everywhere
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) Protection from malicious software
Setting
Safe Links applies to email, Teams, and Office apps with click tracking, and Safe Attachments applies to email and to SharePoint, OneDrive, and Teams.
Why it matters
Links and attachments are checked at the moment of use, which catches threats that were weaponized after the message arrived.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Safe Links on for email, Teams, and Office apps | 5 |
| Safe Attachments on for email | 3 |
| Safe Attachments on for SharePoint, OneDrive, and Teams | 2 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: Safe Links and Safe Attachments in Defender for Office 365
How it is assessed
- Exchange: Get-SafeLinksPolicy, Get-SafeAttachmentPolicy, Get-AtpPolicyForO365
Contain outbound abuse and infected files
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) Protection from malicious software; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(6) Security incident procedures
Setting
Outbound spam limits are set and administrators are notified when a user is blocked for sending spam, zero-hour auto purge is on for email, and infected files cannot be downloaded from SharePoint or OneDrive.
Why it matters
A compromised account usually starts sending spam within minutes. Outbound limits and notifications turn that into an early warning.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Outbound limits set with administrator notification | 4 |
| Zero-hour auto purge on for email | 3 |
| Infected file download blocked | 3 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: outbound spam policies, zero-hour auto purge, and blocking infected file downloads
How it is assessed
- Exchange: Get-HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy
- Exchange: Get-HostedContentFilterPolicy (ZapEnabled)
- SharePoint: DisallowInfectedFileDownload; verify app-only collection
45 CFR 164.308(a)(6)
Security Incident Procedures and Workforce Awareness
Controls that make sure suspicious activity gets reported, reaches someone who can act on it, and that the workforce is trained to recognize it.
4 controls in this section
Make it easy to report suspicious messages
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(6) Security incident procedures; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(i) Security awareness and training
Setting
The built-in Report button is enabled in Outlook, reports go to a monitored mailbox, and staff can flag a suspicious Teams message for security review.
Why it matters
Staff are often the first to notice a phishing attempt. Reporting should take one click and reach someone who will act on it.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Outlook Report button enabled | 4 |
| Reports go to a monitored mailbox | 3 |
| Teams security reporting enabled | 3 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: user reported message settings and Teams security reporting
How it is assessed
- Exchange: Get-ReportSubmissionPolicy
- Teams PowerShell: Get-CsTeamsMessagingPolicy (AllowSecurityEndUserReporting); verify app-only support
Route security alerts to a monitored mailbox
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(6) Security incident procedures; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) Information system activity review
Setting
Tenant technical and security notification contacts are current, default alert policies are enabled with recipients who monitor them, and emergency access sign-ins generate an alert.
Why it matters
Microsoft generates alerts for many attack patterns, but only if someone receives them.
Scoring
| Component | Points available |
|---|---|
| Technical and security contacts set | 3 |
| Default alert policies enabled with monitored recipients | 4 |
| Emergency access sign-in alert configured | 3 |
| Total available | 10 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- Microsoft Learn: alert policies in Microsoft 365
How it is assessed
- Graph: GET /organization (technicalNotificationMails, securityComplianceNotificationMails)
- Security and Compliance: Get-ProtectionAlert
Document an account compromise response procedure
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(6) Security incident procedures
Setting
A written procedure covers a compromised Microsoft 365 account: revoke sessions, reset credentials and MFA methods, remove malicious inbox rules and forwarding, review audit activity, and start the breach risk assessment.
Why it matters
The first hour after a compromise decides how much data leaves. A written checklist keeps steps from being skipped under pressure.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Attested with supporting evidence on fileTarget | 10 |
| Attested without supporting evidence | 6 |
| Partially in place | 4 |
| Not attested | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- 45 CFR 164.308(a)(6)
- 45 CFR 164.402 breach risk assessment
- Microsoft Learn: responding to a compromised email account
How it is assessed
- Manual attestation with the procedure document
Run phishing simulation and security awareness training
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(i) Security awareness and training
Setting
The workforce completes security awareness training at least annually and receives simulated phishing at least quarterly, with results tracked.
Why it matters
Technical controls reduce how many phishing messages arrive. Training reduces how many succeed.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Attested with supporting evidence on fileTarget | 10 |
| Attested without supporting evidence | 6 |
| Partially in place | 4 |
| Not attested | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)
- HHS 405(d) Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices
How it is assessed
- Manual attestation with training and simulation records
45 CFR 164.308(a)(7)
Contingency Planning
Controls that make sure Microsoft 365 data can be recovered after deletion, corruption, or ransomware.
1 controls in this section
Back up Microsoft 365 data independently and test restores
#HIPAA: 45 CFR 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) Data backup plan; 45 CFR 164.308(a)(7) Contingency plan
Setting
Exchange, OneDrive, SharePoint, and Teams data is backed up by a service independent of Microsoft 365 retention, and a restore is tested at least annually.
Why it matters
Microsoft keeps the service running, but deleted, encrypted, or overwritten data is the organization's problem. Recycle bins and retention are not a backup.
Scoring
| Observed configuration | Points |
|---|---|
| Attested with supporting evidence on fileTarget | 10 |
| Attested without supporting evidence | 6 |
| Partially in place | 4 |
| Not attested | 0 |
Exclusions, basis, and how it is assessed
Permitted documented exclusions
None.
Basis
- 45 CFR 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) data backup plan
- Microsoft Learn: shared responsibility in the cloud
How it is assessed
- Manual attestation with backup scope and last restore test date
Control Summary
Every control in this edition. Select an ID to open it.
| ID | Title | Level | Priority | License | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HCSB-AUTH-01 | Require multifactor authentication for every user | Core | Critical | Entra ID P1 | Automated |
| HCSB-AUTH-02 | Require multifactor authentication for administrative roles | Core | Critical | Entra ID P1 | Automated |
| HCSB-AUTH-03 | Require phishing-resistant authentication for administrators | Core | High | Entra ID P1 | Automated |
| HCSB-AUTH-04 | Block legacy authentication protocols | Core | Critical | Entra ID P1 | Automated |
| HCSB-AUTH-05 | Disable SMTP AUTH client submission except for documented device accounts | Core | Critical | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-AUTH-06 | Block device code flow and authentication transfer | Core | High | Entra ID P1 | Automated |
| HCSB-AUTH-07 | Disable weak authentication methods | Core | High | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-AUTH-08 | Every active user is registered for multifactor authentication | Core | High | Entra ID P1 | Automated |
| HCSB-AUTH-09 | Use a custom banned password list and smart lockout | Core | Standard | Entra ID P1 | Automated |
| HCSB-AUTH-10 | Enforce password protection on on-premises Active Directory | Core | Standard | Hybrid identity only | Automated |
| HCSB-AUTH-11 | Do not force periodic password expiration | Core | Standard | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-AUTH-12 | Respond automatically to risky sign-ins and risky users | Enhanced | High | Entra ID P2 | Automated |
| HCSB-AUTH-13 | Protect security information registration | Core | High | Entra ID P1 | Automated |
| HCSB-AUTH-14 | Synchronize password hashes in hybrid environments | Core | Standard | Hybrid identity only | Automated |
| HCSB-ACC-01 | Provide break-glass administrative access | Core | High | Any | Manual |
| HCSB-ACC-02 | Limit Global Administrators to fewer than five, with at least two | Core | High | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-ACC-03 | Use dedicated, cloud-only administrative accounts | Core | Critical | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-ACC-04 | Assign privileged roles just in time | Enhanced | High | Entra ID P2 | Automated |
| HCSB-ACC-05 | Control application consent and registration | Core | High | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-ACC-06 | Restrict device join and local administrator rights | Core | High | Entra ID P1 | Automated |
| HCSB-ACC-07 | Reach shared mailboxes only through individual accounts | Core | Standard | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-ACC-08 | Require a managed device for access to organizational data | Core | High | Entra ID P1 | Automated |
| HCSB-ACC-09 | Protect organizational data on personal mobile devices | Core | High | Intune | Automated |
| HCSB-SES-01 | Require periodic reauthentication for all users | Core | High | Entra ID P1 | Automated |
| HCSB-SES-02 | Short sessions and non-persistent browsers for administrators | Core | High | Entra ID P1 | Automated |
| HCSB-SES-03 | Sign out idle web sessions | Core | Standard | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-SES-04 | Require a fresh sign-in to enroll a device | Core | Standard | Intune | Automated |
| HCSB-EXT-01 | Limit guest invitations and guest directory access | Core | High | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-EXT-02 | Restrict SharePoint and OneDrive external sharing | Core | High | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-EXT-03 | Set safe sharing defaults and guest expiration | Core | Standard | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-EXT-04 | Limit Teams external communication to known partners | Core | Standard | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-EXT-05 | Secure Teams meetings, including telehealth | Core | Standard | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-EXT-06 | Keep organizational mail out of personal accounts and add-ins | Core | Standard | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-EXT-07 | Restrict Power BI and Fabric publishing and external sharing | Core | Standard | Power BI or Fabric | Manual |
| HCSB-AUD-01 | Turn on unified audit logging | Core | Critical | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-AUD-02 | Audit every mailbox with no bypass | Core | High | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-AUD-03 | Retain audit and sign-in logs for at least one year | Core | High | Any | Manual |
| HCSB-AUD-04 | Review sign-in and audit activity on a schedule | Core | High | Any | Manual |
| HCSB-TRN-01 | Block automatic forwarding to external addresses | Core | Critical | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-TRN-02 | Encrypt outbound email containing patient information | Core | High | Any | Manual |
| HCSB-TRN-03 | Publish SPF and enable DKIM for every sending domain | Core | High | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-TRN-04 | Enforce DMARC on every domain | Core | High | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-TRN-05 | Do not let mail flow rules or allow lists bypass filtering | Core | High | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-TRN-06 | Identify mail from external senders | Core | Standard | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-TRN-07 | Reject unauthenticated Direct Send | Enhanced | Standard | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-TRN-08 | Detect and act on patient information in outbound content | Enhanced | High | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-MAL-01 | Block dangerous attachment types | Core | High | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-MAL-02 | Configure anti-phishing and spoof protection | Core | High | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-MAL-03 | Protect leaders and the organization's domains from impersonation | Enhanced | High | Defender for Office 365 P1 | Automated |
| HCSB-MAL-04 | Turn on Safe Links and Safe Attachments everywhere | Enhanced | High | Defender for Office 365 P1 | Automated |
| HCSB-MAL-05 | Contain outbound abuse and infected files | Core | Standard | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-INC-01 | Make it easy to report suspicious messages | Core | Standard | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-INC-02 | Route security alerts to a monitored mailbox | Core | High | Any | Automated |
| HCSB-INC-03 | Document an account compromise response procedure | Core | High | Any | Manual |
| HCSB-INC-04 | Run phishing simulation and security awareness training | Core | High | Any | Manual |
| HCSB-CON-01 | Back up Microsoft 365 data independently and test restores | Core | High | Any | Manual |
56 controls: 50 Core, 6 Enhanced.
HIPAA Security Rule Index
Each HIPAA Security Rule standard or implementation specification, with the controls that support it.
| Citation | Standard or specification | Controls |
|---|---|---|
| 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) | Risk management | HCSB-TRN-08 |
| 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) | Information system activity review | HCSB-AUTH-12, HCSB-AUD-01, HCSB-AUD-03, HCSB-AUD-04, HCSB-INC-02 |
| 45 CFR 164.308(a)(3) | Workforce security | HCSB-ACC-02 |
| 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4) | Information access management | HCSB-AUTH-02, HCSB-ACC-02, HCSB-ACC-03, HCSB-ACC-04, HCSB-ACC-05, HCSB-ACC-06, HCSB-ACC-08, HCSB-EXT-01, HCSB-EXT-02, HCSB-EXT-03, HCSB-EXT-04, HCSB-EXT-05, HCSB-EXT-06, HCSB-EXT-07, HCSB-TRN-01 |
| 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(i) | Security awareness and training | HCSB-INC-01, HCSB-INC-04 |
| 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) | Protection from malicious software | HCSB-EXT-04, HCSB-TRN-05, HCSB-TRN-06, HCSB-TRN-07, HCSB-MAL-01, HCSB-MAL-02, HCSB-MAL-03, HCSB-MAL-04, HCSB-MAL-05 |
| 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) | Log-in monitoring | HCSB-AUTH-09, HCSB-AUTH-12, HCSB-AUD-04 |
| 45 CFR 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(D) | Password management | HCSB-AUTH-01, HCSB-AUTH-09, HCSB-AUTH-10, HCSB-AUTH-11 |
| 45 CFR 164.308(a)(6) | Security incident procedures | HCSB-MAL-05, HCSB-INC-01, HCSB-INC-02, HCSB-INC-03 |
| 45 CFR 164.308(a)(7) | Contingency plan | HCSB-AUTH-14, HCSB-CON-01 |
| 45 CFR 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) | Data backup plan | HCSB-CON-01 |
| 45 CFR 164.312(a)(1) | Access control | HCSB-ACC-03, HCSB-ACC-04, HCSB-ACC-05, HCSB-ACC-06, HCSB-ACC-08, HCSB-ACC-09, HCSB-EXT-02, HCSB-EXT-05, HCSB-EXT-07 |
| 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(i) | Unique user identification | HCSB-ACC-07 |
| 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(ii) | Emergency access procedure | HCSB-ACC-01 |
| 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(iii) | Automatic logoff | HCSB-SES-01, HCSB-SES-02, HCSB-SES-03 |
| 45 CFR 164.312(b) | Audit controls | HCSB-AUD-01, HCSB-AUD-02, HCSB-AUD-03 |
| 45 CFR 164.312(c)(1) | Integrity | HCSB-TRN-03, HCSB-TRN-04, HCSB-TRN-05, HCSB-TRN-07 |
| 45 CFR 164.312(d) | Person or entity authentication | HCSB-AUTH-01, HCSB-AUTH-02, HCSB-AUTH-03, HCSB-AUTH-04, HCSB-AUTH-05, HCSB-AUTH-06, HCSB-AUTH-07, HCSB-AUTH-08, HCSB-AUTH-13, HCSB-AUTH-14, HCSB-SES-01, HCSB-SES-02, HCSB-SES-04 |
| 45 CFR 164.312(e)(1) | Transmission security | HCSB-AUTH-05, HCSB-EXT-06, HCSB-TRN-01, HCSB-TRN-02, HCSB-TRN-03, HCSB-TRN-04, HCSB-TRN-08 |
| 45 CFR 164.312(e)(2)(ii) | Encryption | HCSB-ACC-09, HCSB-TRN-02 |
References
This baseline cites or draws on the following sources. It does not reproduce content from any of them, and no source organization has reviewed or endorsed it.
- 45 CFR Part 164, Subpart C (HIPAA Security Rule)
- NIST Special Publication 800-63B Revision 4, Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator Management
- Microsoft Learn documentation for Microsoft Entra ID, Exchange Online, SharePoint Online, Microsoft Teams, Microsoft Intune, and Microsoft Defender for Office 365
- CISA Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) Microsoft 365 secure configuration baselines
- HHS 405(d) Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices (HICP)
Notice and License
Copyright 2026 VISUAFUSION LLC.
License. Except for the trademarks described below, this document is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). You may copy, share, and adapt it for any purpose, including commercially, if you give credit to VISUAFUSION LLC, include a link to the license, and indicate any changes you made.
Trademarks. The names visuaFUSION, HCSB, HITSA, and related logos are trademarks of VISUAFUSION LLC and are not licensed under CC BY 4.0. You may use the title of the unmodified document to identify it. If you modify HCSB, do not call the result HCSB, and do not state or suggest that visuaFUSION wrote, reviewed, certified, or endorsed it.
Third-party names. Microsoft, Microsoft 365, Entra, Intune, Defender, Purview, Exchange, SharePoint, OneDrive, and Teams are trademarks of the Microsoft group of companies. HCSB is independent. It is not affiliated with, sponsored by, or endorsed by Microsoft, NIST, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, CISA, or any other organization listed in the references.
What this document is. HCSB is an openly published security baseline for health care organizations and the IT service providers who support them. It is offered for voluntary use as a shared reference. It is not a mandatory standard, not legal, compliance, or professional advice, and not a statement that any organization meets the HIPAA Security Rule or any other law. Scores produced using HCSB are not compliance ratings.
No warranty; limited liability. HCSB is provided "as is" and "as available," without warranties of any kind, express or implied, including accuracy, completeness, fitness for a particular purpose, and non-infringement. Microsoft 365 changes often, and settings may be out of date. Test changes before applying them to production systems, and consult qualified advisors about your own obligations. To the fullest extent permitted by law, VISUAFUSION LLC is not liable for any loss arising from use of or reliance on HCSB. This notice does not change any written agreement between VISUAFUSION LLC and a client, and that agreement controls for that client.
Revision History
| Version | Date | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 26.11.18.2 | November 18, 2026 | Added how a score is written (Baseline Score plus Above Baseline points) and the list of bonus-eligible controls |
| 26.11.18.1 | November 18, 2026 | Reframed as an openly published baseline for health care organizations and the IT service providers who support them |
| 26.11.17.3 | November 17, 2026 | Renamed to Health Care Security Baseline (HCSB), Microsoft 365 edition; control IDs now use the HCSB prefix |
| 26.11.17.2 | November 17, 2026 | Added license and notice, per-control basis, and revised references |
| 26.11.17.1 | November 17, 2026 | Initial publication draft |